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appraiSinG the role of the ifc  
anD itS inDepenDent accountability 
mechaniSm: community experienceS  
in haiti’S mininG Sector
Kate Nancy Taylor*
I. IntroductIon
In 2010, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) pur-chased an equity stake in Eurasian Minerals Inc., a junior mining company conducting gold and copper exploration 
activities in Northern Haiti. The investment formed part of the 
IFC’s Early Equity portfolio, which supports private sector 
investment in nascent mineral markets. This article examines the 
governance role played by the IFC over the course of the com-
pany’s exploration activities in 2010 through 2012, after which 
a de facto moratorium emerged over gold mining operations in 
Haiti. This article sets out to scrutinize the role played by the 
IFC during the life of its investment in Haiti, querying the extent 
to which it was able to enhance the environmental and social 
outcomes and foster greater public accountability of the proj-
ect—paying particular attention to the nature of IFC investments 
in the earliest phases of mining operations and highlighting the 
importance of obligations regarding community engagement 
and information disclosure to project-affected communities.
The cornerstone of the IFC’s accountability framework 
is the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), which oper-
ates as the institution’s independent accountability mechanism 
(IAM). Over the last twenty years, IAMs have emerged as a 
staple feature of international finance institutions, during a 
time in which the idea of citizen-led accountability has gained 
currency in multilateral development finance. Despite the pri-
macy of this idea, this article argues that the CAO was not an 
accessible or appropriate mode of redress for project-affected 
communities in Haiti. Drawing on the Haiti case study, this 
article focuses on how different stages of community mobiliza-
tion against mining projects can shape and constrain the capac-
ity of the CAO to enhance citizen-led accountability. Given the 
IFC’s recently stated preference for early equity investments in 
the mining sector, this analysis is necessary to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of how recourse to the CAO functions 
for project-affected communities during the earliest phases of 
a mine’s life cycle.
Part II of this article sets out the governance architecture 
of an IFC-sponsored project, drawing out the applicable norms 
and standards that apply to such projects and highlighting the 
role and functions of the CAO in particular. Part III goes on to 
examine the nature of the IFC’s early equity investment in Haiti, 
and conducts a brief analysis of how Eurasian’s conduct over 
the course of its exploration activities failed to meet the IFC’s 
Performance Standards with respect to community engagement 
and the company’s administration of land access agreements 
in La Montagne, in Haiti’s Northwest Department. With these 
deficiencies in mind, Part IV examines why project-affected 
communities did not have recourse to the CAO to address the 
company’s failures. Part V concludes that the CAO needs better 
solutions for engaging vulnerable project-affected communities.
II. role And functIons of the Ifc And cAo
(a) early equity inveStmentS in the mininG Sector
The IFC is the world’s largest multilateral institution sup-
porting private sector investment, with investments and advisory 
services in over 100 developing countries.1 Given the gov-
ernance role played by the institution, its potential to redefine 
accountability relationships and institutionalize environmental 
and social safeguards in the mining sector could be critical for 
the people and communities affected by IFC-sponsored proj-
ects.2 While the IFC’s largest investments are related to infra-
structure, agribusiness, and forestry industries, it has shown an 
increasing preference for investments in oil, gas, and mining 
industries in recent years—with investments in the sector rising 
from approximately $229 million USD in 2011 to $514 million 
USD in 2015.3 Under the IFC’s “Early Equity Program,” the IFC 
intentionally supports nascent mineral markets by targeting proj-
ects at the earliest stages of mining activity.4
Through its Early Equity Program, the IFC “looks to partner 
with junior mining companies with good management and help 
them address environmental and social issues maybe four or five 
years before they begin developing mines.”5 The program allows 
the IFC to balance what appears to be two of its key impera-
tives—first, its commitment to natural resource extraction as an 
important feature of economic development in the world’s poor-
est countries, and second, its fidelity to projects that maintain 
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sound environmental and social practices. By investing in the 
mining sector at the early stages, the IFC tries to limit its expo-
sure to the more complex and invasive environmental and social 
harms associated with a mine’s development and production 
while maintaining its fundamental support for the industry. With 
respect to the IFC’s investment in Eurasian’s operations in Haiti, 
for example, the IFC noted that its investment in the exploration 
stage of Eurasian’s projects would only yield “limited” develop-
ment impacts for Haiti, other than generating local employment 
and the purported “positive impact of attracting additional for-
eign investments to an underdeveloped but promising sector” of 
the economy.6
Notwithstanding the purported “light footprint” left by 
mineral exploration, the IFC’s Sustainability Framework 
applies equally to the IFC’s early equity investments in the 
mining sector.7 The Sustainability Framework consists of 
the IFCs’ Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability 
(which defines the nature of the IFC’s commitments), the 
Environmental and Social Performance Standards (which 
define clients’ responsibilities for managing their risks), the 
Access to Information Policy (which sets the parameters for 
the IFC’s information disclosure), and the procedures for 
Environmental and Social Categorization (which the IFC uses 
to categorize the risks of a project).8 Taken together, these ele-
ments are intended to have far-reaching consequences for the 
governance of a project, both internally and externally. The 
Framework plays important internal governance functions, by 
governing how the IFC itself should conduct its due diligence 
and ensuring the transparency of its involvement. Externally, 
the Framework (primarily through the Performance Standards) 
seeks to regulate and influence the behavior of the company 
that has accepted the IFC’s funding through debt or equity.9 To 
the extent that the Sustainability Framework fulfills this exter-
nal governance function, the IFC’s Early Equity Program could 
have beneficial effects for project-affected communities that 
endure into the later phases of a mine’s development. In theory, 
institutionalizing strong environmental and social practices 
in the earliest stages of the life cycle of a mine is prudent, as 
implementing best practice from the outset could help to alle-
viate the more acute environmental and social issues that are 
likely to arise as the mine matures. Therefore, even in the early 
life of projects, the IFC’s Sustainability Framework could play 
an important role in governing how environmental and social 
risks of a project are managed, and redefining the account-
ability relationships that exist between the IFC, the company, 
and project-affected communities. For that role to be fully real-
ized, both the IFC and its clients must strictly adhere to the 
IFC’s Sustainability Framework, and there must be appropriate 
modes of citizen accountability through which project-affected 
communities can voice their grievances about non-compliance 
with the Framework.
(b) the eStabliShment of the cao: accountability 
aS a watchworD in Development finance
As the IFC’s independent accountability mechanism, the 
CAO is charged with a mandate to be directly responsive to the 
concerns of project-affected communities.10 It plays a critical 
role in providing a forum for communities to raise claims about a 
project’s environmental and social impacts, and ensuring that the 
IFC and the company are adhering to their respective obligations 
under the IFC’s Sustainability Framework. Before evaluating 
whether the CAO functions effectively for communities affected 
by early equity investments, it is necessary to understand the 
circumstances that gave rise to the creation of the CAO, and 
the normative purposes it is designed to achieve. In doing so, 
it becomes clear how the nature of early equity investments can 
shape and constrain the capacity of the CAO to achieve its objec-
tives in the context of specific communities and/or countries.
Since the early 1990s, accountability has become a watch-
word in multilateral development finance.11 The idea that the 
legitimacy of an international financial institution is tied to 
the extent to which it is accountable to the people affected by 
their projects has increasingly gained currency. The notion of 
citizen-led accountability—which refers broadly to the capac-
ity of project-affected peoples and communities to demand that 
their localized grievances be addressed—was first operational-
ized by the World Bank in 1993, with the establishment of the 
World Bank Inspection Panel.12 The Panel takes requests from 
groups who have harmed by a Bank-financed project, and pro-
vides a forum for communities to raise claims that the Bank has 
failed to follow its operational policies.13 The creation of the 
Inspection Panel was spurred by the work of the World Bank’s 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and International Development Association (IDA) performing 
essentially public functions (such as building public develop-
ment infrastructure) with no capacity for to hear the voices of 
project-affected peoples.14 This accountability deficit within the 
World Bank (and other regional development banks) was exac-
erbated by the reality that frequently, project-affected communi-
ties could not rely on their governments to assert their interests, 
since those same governments were partners in the operations 
and did not have strong enough institutional capacity to regulate 
and manage the environmental and social impacts of Bank-
projects. Compounding this accountability gap, project-affected 
communities are denied recourse to domestic courts in disputes 
against international finance institutions, which are customarily 
granted jurisdictional immunity before domestic courts by their 
constituent member states.15
As a private lending institution, the need for the IFC to be 
responsive to project-affected communities was not a significant 
issue until well into the 1990s. Between 1956 and 1990, the IFC 
was primarily engaged in non-recourse financing of industrial 
and financial projects in emerging markets, rather than large 
infrastructure projects which were government-led.16 Beginning 
in the late 1980s, the IFC began to involve itself in financing pri-
vate infrastructure projects in developing countries,17 prompted 
by the emphasis on the privatization of state enterprises, 
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including state mining assets, advanced by the Washington 
Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. This shift in IFC-investment 
priorities meant a sudden engagement in projects that entailed 
more acute environmental and social harms, which took place 
without a parallel development of accountability mechanisms 
for project-affected communities. This accountability deficit 
was brought to the forefront in 1996, in the context of a hydro-
electric project on the BioBio River in Chile, which directly 
affected both indigenous and non-indigenous communities in 
the region.18 A Chilean NGO had filed a complaint to the World 
Bank’s Inspection Panel in 1995, which found it had no juris-
diction over IFC-sponsored projects.19 As a result of significant 
pressure emanating from international NGOs and domestic pres-
sure within Chile, the World Bank established the CAO in 1999, 
with a mandate to address complaints from people affected by 
projects sponsored by the IFC or guaranteed by the World Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 20
The CAO is intended to operate as a fallback mechanism, to 
offer recourse to project-affected communities in circumstances 
where their grievances are not resolved by the company at the 
operation-level, or through legal and administrative procedures 
at the state level.21 This mode of recourse offered by the CAO 
becomes critically important where a company is not responsive 
to the community’s concerns and where the state’s preference 
for uninterrupted economic development outweighs its desire to 
assert or otherwise address the rights of project-affected people. 
In the context of mining operations, the IFC’s involvement in a 
project can potentially add a layer of accountability to the typi-
cally vexed tripartite relationship that exists between the state, a 
mining company and affected communities.
Today, the notion of citizen-led accountability is regarded as 
the key rationale for the proliferation of IAMs by development 
finance institutions, and is often represented as the cornerstone of 
sustainable development.22 In addition to the World Bank Group, 
the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks, 
as well as the European Bank have adopted IAMs in various 
forms for Reconstruction and Development and the European 
Investment Bank.23 A 2016 report on the “State of Accountability 
in Development Finance” identified a total of 758 complaints sub-
mitted over the past 21 years to 11 different IAMs.24
With over 20 years having passed since the creation of 
the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, most recent commentaries 
acknowledge that the proliferation of IAMs has resulted in the 
increased accountability of IFIs to protect affected persons.25 
This is not without qualification. MacDonald and Miller-
Dawkins take the view that while the IAMs’ accountability 
practices have been linked to “significant shifts in the norms and 
power relations underpinning decision-making in contemporary 
development finance,” those shifts have been “modest and con-
text-dependent.”26 With respect to the CAO, Saper takes a more 
restrictive view of the concept of ‘accountability’ in this con-
text,27 though conceding that the CAO has “increased the IFC/
MIGA’s responsiveness to a variety of project-affected people by 
providing information disclosure, by creating opportunities for 
participation in problem solving, and by requiring IFC/MIGA to 
publicly give reasons for its action.”28 While there are multiple 
qualitative case studies that interrogate how the use of IAMs 
have increased accountability “over the life history of a griev-
ance,”29 there has not been any parallel interrogation of cases 
in which IAMs have entirely failed to bring about increased 
accountability because a complaint was never submitted. By 
drawing upon the case study of mineral exploration activities in 
Northern Haiti, where project-affected communities could have 
had recourse to the CAO but did not, we can see how certain 
institutional and operational deficiencies in the mechanism, cou-
pled with important contextual factors, undermined its capacity 
to bring about citizen-led accountability.
(c) compliance, aDviSory anD  
ombuDSman functionS
The CAO has three complementary roles—its compliance, 
advisory, and ombudsman functions. Any individual or group 
who is affected, or potentially affected, by the environmental or 
social impacts of an IFC or MIGA project may make complaints 
to the CAO.30 After the CAO team determines the eligibility of 
the complaint and conducts an initial assessment of the issues and 
stakeholders, 31 project-affected communities may then have their 
claims addressed by the ombudsman or compliance functions.32
The CAO ombudsman functions as a dispute resolution 
body, which is focused on “flexible, collaborative processes, 
aimed at seeking joint solutions to the issues raised in the com-
plaint.”33 Engaging the ombudsman function therefore requires 
the voluntary agreement of both the affected community and 
the company that has received IFC funding or is guaranteed by 
MIGA. The ombudsman has no power to issue binding decisions 
against the company for non-compliance with the Performance 
Standards.34 However, the CAO actually perceives its lack of 
binding powers to be its greatest asset, since it takes the par-
ties outside an adversarial setting.35 It contends that the dispute 
resolution process can move the dispute “beyond judgment and 
finding fault to focus on practical, effective, and sustainable 
solutions for all involved.”36 This can be particularly important 
in cases where communities are aggrieved that the company has 
ignored their interests and breached its obligation to conduct 
adequate stakeholder engagement—a concern that is raised in 
60 percent of all CAO complaints.37 The goal of the process is 
to walk away with a sustainable agreement between the commu-
nities and the companies, and may include proposals for future 
action. For example, an agreement in the Yanacocha Gold Mine 
case in Peru resulted in the CAO training community members 
to conduct participatory water monitoring, together with the 
company.38 The ombudsman’s emphasis on collaborative prob-
lem solving places the company-community relationship at the 
center of its intervention—adhering to the view that procedural 
and informational forms of justice may be equally as important 
as any distributional outcomes arising from the process.39
Of all the CAO’s functions, the ombudsman function is 
perhaps best positioned to address some of the concerns of 
project-affected communities in the context of early equity 
investments in the mining sector, where the environmental 
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and social impacts of mineral exploration are relatively non-
invasive, but issues of community engagement and information 
disclosure are of central concern. In these contexts, the poten-
tial for recourse to the ombudsman represents an important 
mode of redress for project-affected people, whose most prom-
inent demand may simply be more information and enhanced 
consultation from the company (as opposed to communities 
who oppose the project in its entirety). It is in this way that 
the ombudsman function can work to re-orient the account-
ability relationships that typically exist between companies 
and affected communities in the mining sector, by enhancing 
communities’ ability to demand information, justification, and 
responsiveness from the company.
Through its compliance function, the CAO scrutinizes the 
IFC’s and MIGA’s own due diligence at the project level.40 The 
focus at this stage is how the IFC or MIGA assured itself of 
the environmental and social performance of its investment, 
both at the initial appraisal stage and during its supervision of 
the project.41 Although the center of the inquiry is the conduct 
of the IFC or MIGA, it is necessary for the CAO to review 
the actions of the company and verify outcomes in the field 
while performing this function.42 The CAO Compliance func-
tion has a three-step process involving an initial appraisal, an 
investigation phase for cases that raise substantial concerns 
or issues of systemic importance, and monitoring of IFC and 
MIGA actions to address findings of noncompliance.43 As 
noted above, the CAO does not have the power to bind the 
IFC or MIGA, and the President and management are free 
to disregard the results of the CAO’s compliance investiga-
tion.44 However, the research and production of a compliance 
investigation (which is publicly released after its completion) 
has the capacity, at the very least, to put information into the 
hands of project-affected communities, and can help to correct 
asymmetries in the informational resources that exists between 
companies and communities.
The CAO’s advisory function operates separately to the 
compliance and ombudsman functions, in that it does not 
address the direct complaints of project-affected communi-
ties.45 It provides advice to the President and IFC and MIGA 
management, highlighting systemic patterns of concern it has 
noticed occurring within the institutions’ projects.46 Its advice 
is derived from the insights gained through the operation of 
its other two functions.47 The advisory function of the CAO 
is the least utilized branch of the CAO, though it has recently 
published an advisory lesson from CAO cases with regard to 
land related issues, which are raised in over 52 percent of CAO 
complaints.48 A discrete focus by the CAO’s advisory function 
on systemic issues in the early equity investment context might 
help to alleviate some of the generalizable concerns and pat-
terns noted in this paper.
III. mInerAl exPlorAtIon In northern hAItI 
(a) the ifc’S equity Stake in euraSian  
mineralS inc.
It is not surprising that the IFC had its sights set on sup-
porting private investment in Haiti’s nascent mineral sector. The 
country’s profile sits squarely within those targeted by the IFC’s 
Early Equity Program—that is, impoverished states in desperate 
need of increased economic development that also possess vast 
unexploited natural resources. For Haiti, both of those conditions 
are met. The country is frequently referred to as “the poorest 
country in the Western hemisphere.”49 With a Gross Domestic 
Product of just $846 USD per capita,50 the vast majority of 
Haiti’s citizens live under severe conditions of socioeconomic 
deprivation.51 Both the Haitian Government and the IFC believe 
that a vital component of reversing the country’s economic des-
titution lies in the mineral belt that spans across Haiti’s Northern 
departments, 52 which is speculated to contain approximately 
US$20 billion in unexploited gold.53
Gold mining in Haiti is a relatively new endeavor,54 and 
companies have not yet moved beyond preliminary research, 
prospection, and exploration activities.55 The IFC contends 
that if the exploration in the country eventually leads to mine 
development and production, “the development impacts for 
Haiti could be substantial.”56 To that end, the IFC invested $10.3 
million USD in equity in Eurasian Minerals Inc. between 2010 
and 2015, intended to fund Eurasian’s prospecting and explora-
tion activities in Haiti.57 Notably, the IFC’s initial contribution 
of $5 million USD received IFC Board Approval on January 
13, 2010—just one day after a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck 
Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince, killing at least 200,000,58 inter-
nally displacing 1.5 million people, and causing an estimated 
$7.8 billion USD in damage.59 The IFC claimed that the invest-
ment came “at a critical time for supporting the country’s recov-
ery through private sector participation.”60 The equity stake in 
Eurasian added to the IFC’s wider investment portfolio in Haiti, 
which included $61 million USD in private sector finance to cli-
ents in the telecom, energy, textile, and manufacturing sectors.61
The IFC’s client in Haiti, Eurasian Minerals Inc., is a 
Canadian company that first initiated a gold and copper explo-
ration program in Haiti in 2006, seeking to take advantage of 
the first-mover opportunities in Haiti’s emerging minerals mar-
ket.62 In 2008, the company signed a joint venture agreement 
with Newmont Ventures Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of US-based Newmont Mining Corp.63 Together, the compa-
nies’ activities covered six “Joint Venture Designated Projects” 
along the Massif du Nord mineral belt in Haiti’s north.64 The 
exploration activities continued until 2013, when the Haitian 
Senate passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on mining, 
following which the government of Haiti began to work with the 
World Bank’s Extractive Industries Technical Assistance Fund to 
draft a new mining law to govern the sector.65 Since that time, 
gold exploration activities in Haiti have remained in “care and 
maintenance status”—effectively dormant.66 In November 2015, 
Eurasian sold its interests in the Newmont-Eurasian joint venture 
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to Newmont.67 Then, in February 2016, Eurasian disposed of 
its last remaining interest in Haiti (the Grand Bois project) to 
a subsidiary of Delaware-based VCS Mining LLC.68 Eurasian 
has retained only marginal royalty interests in both Newmont’s 
assets in Haiti and the Grand Bois project.69 In January 2016, the 
IFC marked its project status in Eurasian as “completed.”70
Since the IFC’s first tranche of funding in early 2010, 
Eurasian was placed under an obligation to ensure that its explo-
ration activities in Haiti complied with the IFC’s Environmental 
and Social Performance Standards.71 The company committed 
to formalizing “existing community engagement activities” and 
agreed to prepare site specific Stakeholder Engagement Plans 
in order to meet the requirements laid out in the Performance 
Standards.72 Eurasian also covenanted to address the envi-
ronmental and social aspects on projects managed by its joint 
venture partner Newmont, “using commercially reasonable 
efforts to encourage its partners to implement IFC Performance 
Standards or equivalent practices.”73
Despite the formal commitments to environmental and 
social safeguards negotiated in the corridors of power in 
Washington D.C., the reality on the ground in Haiti was vastly 
different. The following section endeavors to discuss some of the 
key ways in which Eurasian (and the Newmont-Eurasian joint 
venture) may have failed to bring the project into compliance 
with applicable Performance Standards during the exploration 
phase of the project, having regard to failures in community 
engagement and the problematic land access agreements the 
company acquired.74
(b) fallinG below the StanDarDS:  
euraSian’S community enGaGement  
anD lanD acceSS aGreementS
Eurasian conducted a variety of exploration activities in 
Haiti’s Northern Departments between 2009 and 2012.75 At the 
outset, the IFC categorized the project’s possible impacts as a 
“Category B” risk, denoting only limited adverse environmen-
tal and social impacts which are generally site-specific, largely 
reversible, and readily addressed through mitigation measures.76 
While it is true that exploration activities in general are sig-
nificantly less invasive than the construction and operation of 
a large-scale open-pit gold mine, Eurasian was nevertheless 
under an enduring obligation to ensure compliance with the 
IFC Performance Standards, including adequate community 
engagement (including duties of consultation and information 
disclosure) and ensuring that its acquisition of any land rights 
complied with the Performance Standard on Land Acquisition 
and Involuntary Resettlement.77 The company’s activities dur-
ing 2009 through 2012 involved early-stage exploration activi-
ties such as surface sampling, as well as late-stage exploration 
activities that involved core drilling and sampling. To conduct 
its exploration activities on privately owned land,78 Eurasian 
concluded a number of land access agreements with landowners 
and occupants sometime between 2011 and 2012.79
The following analysis seeks to highlight the discrepancies 
between the lived experiences of project-affected communities 
in Northern Haiti and the obligations owed by Eurasian under 
IFC Performance Standard 1 (detailing the requirements for 
community engagement) and Performance Standard 5 (detailing 
the requirements for land acquisition). While there may have 
been other environmental and social impacts brought about by 
Eurasian’s exploration activities, this analysis has been delib-
erately confined to issues of community engagement and land 
acquisition due to limitations in available evidence.80
Since Eurasian placed its projects in care and mainte-
nance status in 2012, the Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at New 
York University School of Law has conducted a number of 
fact-finding visits to Haiti’s Northwest Department to inter-
view project-affected communities. The GJC, acting together 
with local community organizers, has interviewed numerous 
community members about their interactions with Eurasian, 
with a particular focus on the land access agreements that 
were concluded between the company and landowners. Their 
experiences highlight the ways in which obligations regarding 
information disclosure and consultation are inextricably linked 
with processes of acquiring consent for land use and acquisition. 
Landholders cannot meaningfully agree to land acquisition or 
use if they are not informed about certain fundamental issues, 
such as the purpose of preliminary mining activity, their rights 
and entitlements under law, and the implications of large-scale 
gold mining if it were to go ahead.
The GJC’s fact-finding efforts led researchers to several 
small communities situated across the hills of La Montagne in 
Haiti’s Northwest department. Newmont-Eurasian conducted 
exploration activities in this area between 2009 and 2012. The 
residents of these villages are primarily farmers—growing 
crops such as beans, plantains and peanuts, and raising small 
livestock.81 During their visits to the La Montage Village, the 
GJC found steep hills and narrow roads isolate the villages from 
the larger communes of Jean Rabel and Baie-de-Henne to the 
north and south of the mountains. Some villages have primary 
schools, though most children must walk hours to access educa-
tion beyond fourth grade. Residents speak Haitian Creole, rather 
than French, which is used by the government and taught in 
secondary schools in Haiti. While there is no reliable data on 
the literacy and education levels of the community members in 
these areas, GJC’s research found that they generally have low 
literacy rates and do not rely on written documents as a method 
of record-keeping.82 Prior to Newmont-Eurasian entering the 
area in 2009, the communities’ interactions with external actors 
and state institutions were extremely limited. These communi-
ties face immense socioeconomic disadvantage and political 
marginalization, which in turn create significant inequalities in 
bargaining power when they interact with mining companies.
During 2011 and 2012, a number of residents in the vil-
lages of La Montagne signed paper agreements that authorized 
Newmont-Eurasian to use their land for exploration activities.83 
These agreements were concluded between landowners/occu-
pants and Eurasian’s Haitian subsidiary, Marien Mining. The 
GJC was unable to verify the exact number of agreements that 
were signed, though it estimated that several hundred land access 
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agreements were signed over the exploration period.84 In inter-
views with GJC researchers, the landowners recounted experi-
ences that raised serious questions about the circumstances in 
which these land access agreements were concluded, and in 
many cases, indicate that informed consent to the agreement was 
not given.85
The land access agreements, written in Creole, are drafted 
in terms which are remarkably favorable to the company, leaving 
the landholders with comparatively few rights, and no benefits 
whatsoever. The agreement grants the company a ‘carte blanche’ 
to perform activities relevant to exploration (including permis-
sion to conduct activities that may destroy the land), and does not 
provide the landowner with a right to terminate the agreement. It 
states that the company will indemnify the landowner for dam-
age to the land and provide compensation for damage to crops, 
though it specifies that those amounts are to be determined by 
the company, and forbids the signatory from making “any other 
monetary demands.”86 Notably, it provides a sweeping limitation 
of the landowners’ rights, stating that the landowner does not 
have the right, during or after the life of the agreement, “to ask 
for anything else, or make any demands or take action against 
the Company that has to do with this contract or its execution, 
for whatever reason.”87 Read together, the provisions of the 
agreement appear to foreclose the rights of the landholder to any 
remedy outside the company’s specified forms of compensation 
for damage.88 These agreements were drafted by company, and 
do not appear to have been open for revision by the landowners 
at any time—suggesting that no meaningful negotiation took 
place as to the agreement’s terms.
In correspondence with the GJC, Newmont-Eurasian has 
contended that the land access agreements were not intended 
to function as legally binding documents between the company 
and the landowners.89 This position is incredibly hard to accept, 
having regard to the agreement’s use of legal language, the 
strength of its terms and the formalities of its execution. One 
of the clauses in the agreement states that the agreement may 
not be “corrected, modified, changed, or amended except in writ-
ing signed by the parties to the agreement or their legal repre-
sentatives.”90 Under the terms of the agreement, the document 
needed to be executed with the signature of the landowner, the 
CEO of Marien Mining and a witness.91 It would take a seri-
ous exercise of legal sophistry to come to the conclusion that 
these agreements were not intended to establish a legally bind-
ing relationship between the parties. Even if the agreements did 
not constitute legally binding documents, it is arguable that the 
formalities in the agreements’ execution were intended to create 
that impression in the mind of the landowners.
In February 2014, local community organizers, together 
with the GJC, brought affected communities together to discuss 
the content and implications of the land access agreements. GJC 
researchers remarked that many of the residents who had signed 
the land access agreements appeared to be learning of their true 
content for the first time.92 Some landholders thought that sign-
ing the agreement meant they were guaranteed jobs with the 
company.93 Another explained that she thought the agreement 
would bring future development benefits, like those brought by 
NGOs.94 Other landholders reported that they were handed the 
agreement to sign, but did not have time to read or understand 
it.95 Many said they had no idea the agreement gave the com-
pany the right to damage their land.96 In other cases, landholders 
reported that they were offered a sum of 1000 Haitian Gourdes 
(approximately $16 USD) in exchange for their signature, but 
reported that they were not informed of the agreement’s con-
tents.97 Others confirmed that they understood they needed to 
sign the Agreement in order to get compensation for damaged 
crops.98 One resident recalled that a company engineer asked 
him if he owned the land, and whether or not he could read. 
When the resident replied that he could not, the engineer then 
dipped the man’s thumb in ink, and affixed it to a land access 
agreement.99 Newmont-Eurasian, in contrast, made the claim 
that it “took nearly two weeks to complete each agreement”.100
It can be argued that Eurasian’s conduct, in carrying out its 
exploration activities in La Montagne, fell short of the obliga-
tions contained in the IFC Performance Standards.101 In par-
ticular, the administration of land access agreements illustrates 
Eurasian’s acute failure to comply with Performance Standard 
1 (PS1), under which the company was obliged to undertake 
effective community engagement. The obligation under PS1 
is comprised of several elements which, relevant to the instant 
case, include consultation and information disclosure.102 These 
duties must also be read together and cross-referenced with 
Performance Standard 5 (PS5), which address the company’s 
obligations regarding land acquisition and resettlement. The key 
objective of PS5 is to anticipate and minimize adverse social 
and economic impacts from land acquisition or restrictions on 
land use, resettlement and displacement. While some landown-
ers raised claims that the company’s exploration activities had 
caused damage to their crops (and thus, economic displacement 
in some instances), it is argued here that the company’s central 
failure related to the process through which the Land Access 
Agreements were negotiated, and the manner in which the com-
munities were informed and consulted about Eurasian’s explora-
tion activities. It is for this reason that Eurasian’s conduct will be 
primarily evaluated according to the company’s compliance with 
PS1, addressing community engagement as the critical concern.
(i) Community EngagEmEnt
Upon receipt of IFC funding, Eurasian began to formalize 
its “existing community engagement activities” and prepare site-
specific Stakeholder Engagement Plans (“SEPs”) for each explo-
ration property.103 No SEPs prepared by Eurasian for its projects 
in Haiti have not been made publicly available, and efforts made 
by the GJC to obtain them via the IFC Information Disclosure 
process or from the companies directly were unsuccessful.104 
As such, the full extent of Eurasian’s community engagement 
is unclear. The extent and adequacy of such stakeholder engage-
ment is not typically revealed or examined unless a complaint 
is filed to the IFC CAO.105 Newmont-Eurasian reported to the 
GJC that they had conducted “formal meetings” with commu-
nity members at the sites of their exploration activities, and that 
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Newmont-Eurasian employees had conducted informal visits 
to individual landowners.106 However, the efficacy of any such 
engagement must be questioned in light of the community mem-
bers’ differing understandings about the nature of the company’s 
exploration activities, and the misinformation about the potenti-
ality of gold extraction in the community’s future. One resident 
of Gode, La Montagne, for example, stated “We were in the dark. 
They took our land and dug on it. They sent a paper to some of us 
and we did not know what it was.”107 Another resident of Lalan, 
La Montagne, recalled “[t]hey showed us that this was a great 
opportunity for us. They said that they were looking for gold . . 
. and if they found [it], they would sell it in another country and 
give us American money.”108 While PS1 emphasizes that SEPs 
form the basis for building “strong, constructive and responsive 
relationships” between the company and communities, it also 
recognizes that the “nature, frequency and level of stakeholder 
engagement may vary considerably and will be commensurate 
with the project’s risks and adverse impacts, and the project’s 
phase of development.”109 In light of this, it might be somewhat 
understandable if a company formed the view that its obligations 
regarding community engagement at the exploration phase of 
mining activity were less onerous, since activities conducted 
during the exploration phase are typically less invasive than late-
stage mining activities.
The communities’ differing understandings of the mining 
activity is, in itself, evidence of the company’s failure to comply 
with the Performance Standards. It must be noted, however, that 
Eurasian conducted its exploration activities in Northern Haiti 
between 2009 and 2012, and it is estimated that the majority 
of Land Access Agreements were administered between 2011 
and 2012.110 Thus, when the GJC interviewed residents in La 
Montagne in 2014, a minimum of two years had passed since 
the company had interacted with the communities. It is possible 
that this passage of time may have led to some level of recall bias 
and confusion about the precise details that community mem-
bers were given by company representatives. However, given 
the importance of the subject matter, it is arguable that Eurasian 
should have gone to greater lengths to ensure that community 
members had an unimpeachable understanding of the materi-
als facts, regarding both the content of the Agreements and the 
nature of Eurasian’s interest in the land. In later correspondence 
with the GJC, in which Newmont-Eurasian were disputing 
allegations that the Land Access Agreements were administered 
improperly, the companies stated that “any information to the 
contrary must be based on a misunderstanding.” 111
(ii) ProjECt Consultation
When a company accepts IFC funding for a project, its 
obligations under the rubric of ‘community engagement’ in PS1 
includes processes of community consultation and participa-
tion.112 The extent of these obligations are commensurate with 
the type, scale, location and likely impact of the project,113 as 
well as the presence of indigenous groups in the project’s vicin-
ity.114 For example, the obligation on companies to undertake an 
“Informed Consultation and Participation” (ICP) process only 
attaches to projects with significant adverse impacts on project-
affected communities.115 For projects with adverse impacts to 
indigenous peoples, in some cases the company is required to 
go beyond ICP, and obtain the group’s Free Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC).116 In the instant case, Eurasian was not tech-
nically obligated by IFC Standards to undertake either ICP or 
FPIC processes, because the company’s exploration activities 
were only categorized as potentially causing ‘limited’ adverse 
impacts on project-affected communities, and did not affect any 
indigenous populations.117 However, even under the weakest 
applicable requirement for community consultation, Eurasian 
appears to have fallen below the standards that attached to its 
project under PS1.
In the instant case, Eurasian was under an obligation to 
undertake a “a process of consultation in a manner that provides 
the affected communities with opportunities to express their views 
on project risks, impacts and mitigation measures, and allows the 
client to consider and respond to them.”118 PS1 explicitly states 
that this is a two-way process that should begin early in the life 
of the project, and must be based on the prior disclosure of easily 
accessible project information.119 Despite the ‘formal meetings’ 
purportedly held by Newmont-Eurasian, it is arguable that the 
consultation process was inadequate, having regard to the enor-
mous inconsistencies between the varying degrees of information 
given to landholders. There also appeared to be a critical com-
munity-wide information deficit about the nature of the venture 
and the possibility of gold mining in the communities’ future.120 
These failures are particularly salient in the earliest stages of min-
ing development, recalling that one of the key purposes of the 
consultation processes is to manage community expectations by 
clarifying the extent of the company’s responsibilities, so that mis-
understandings and unrealistic demands can be avoided.121 Based 
on the expectations held by many project-affected people in La 
Montagne, Eurasian’s consultation processes failed in this regard. 
One resident of Gode, La Montagne, stated that “if they found 
gold on your land they would give you a house if you deserved a 
house, a car if you deserved a car”.122 Another resident of Lalan, 
La Montagne recalled the impression that if the company found 
gold on residents’ land, they could “even get a visa to leave the 
country.”123 Newmont-Eurasian later rejected allegations that 
residents were promised visas in exchange for signing land access 
agreements,124 but the “expectation management” envisioned by 
the PS1 seems to have failed spectacularly.
The IFC itself recognizes that companies often make ‘stra-
tegic choices’ about community consultation in the early stages 
of large-scale projects.125 Outside the Performance Standards, 
the IFC encourages businesses to ‘disclose and consult selec-
tively in the very early stages’, because “full public disclosure of 
information may not always be feasible or prudent, and can lead 
to unintended consequences such as raised expectations, fears, 
or speculative behavior, as well as pose business risks vis-à-vis 
competitors.”126 It notes that some of the particular challenges 
in the exploration phase include difficulties in explaining the 
nature of exploration to communities, informing them about the 
differences between exploration and an actual mining operation, 
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and trying to manage expectations in the face of uncertain out-
comes.127 This is important in the later phases of exploration 
activities, as core-drilling equipment can easily be misconstrued 
as active mining.128 Although parsing out these complexities 
to local communities does demand a thorough consultation 
process, a failure to do so could create long-standing and deep 
divisions between the company and communities. In the case 
of exploration activities in northern Haiti, Newmont-Eurasian’s 
consultation with project-affected communities seems to have 
bred distrust toward mining companies.129 This is particularly 
important if gold mining extraction goes ahead in Haiti, since 
community consultation during the exploration phase can “often 
set the tone for the remainder of the project’s life.” 130
(iii) information DisClosurE
Eurasian’s obligations regarding consultation were inex-
tricably tied to its obligations surrounding information dis-
closure, since the quality of any consultation efforts should 
be measured in light of the scope of the information made 
available to the project-affected community. Information dis-
closure is a critical part of community engagement, as it allows 
project-affected communities to understand the risks, impacts 
and opportunities of a project.131 As evidenced by the state-
ments made by residents about the purpose and content of the 
land access agreements, the residents of La Montagne do not 
seem to have received sufficient information about Eurasian’s 
exploration activities in their communities.
The requirements of IFC’s PS1 mandate that the client 
(here, Eurasian) will provide project-affected communities with 
access to relevant information on (i) the purpose, nature, and 
scale of the project; (ii) the duration of proposed project activi-
ties; (iii) any risks to and potential impacts on such communities 
and relevant mitigation measures; (iv) the envisaged stakeholder 
engagement process; and (v) the company’s operational-level 
grievance mechanism.132 With respect to the land access agree-
ments, Eurasian was also under an obligation under PS1 and PS5 
to ensure that landowners were given sufficient information to 
understand the nature of the terms and the legal implications 
of the agreements.133 The guidance note that accompanies PS5 
states that in negotiating agreements for land acquisition (includ-
ing land use), the company should summarize all relevant infor-
mation for public disclosure, and ensure that all project-affected 
people understand the acquisition procedures and know what 
to expect at the various stages of the transaction (e.g., when an 
offer will be made to them, how long they will have to respond, 
grievance mechanism, legal procedures to be followed if nego-
tiations fail).134 Based on the landowners’ various comments and 
impressions of the Agreements and the mining venture gener-
ally, it appears that Eurasian’s conduct represented a serious 
departure from the requirements laid out in PS1 and PS5. Many 
residents of La Montagne stated that they did not understand 
that the land access agreements granted the company the right 
to explore for gold on their land, and were uninformed about 
the risks and consequences of mineral exploration.135 Interviews 
with landowners revealed that very few of them knew they had 
the right to refuse to sign the agreement.136 More generally, the 
IFC Performance Standards also encourage clients to provide 
relevant documentation, such as Stakeholder Engagement Plans, 
Ecosystem Restoration plans, and the company’s environmental 
and social policies.137 PS1 also encourages the client to provide 
“easy-to-understand” summaries of key issues and commit-
ments.138 The information should be in the appropriate language, 
and accessible and understandable to the various segments of the 
affected communities.139 After its exploration activities were 
completed, Newmont-Eurasian confirmed that it did not prepare 
any educational or explanatory documents about key issues for 
the community, and stated that it only shared information with 
community members orally.140
The failures related to information disclosure were not 
Eurasian’s alone. It must be kept in mind that the primary duty to 
inform project-affected communities about mining activity and 
to protect their human rights lies with the government of Haiti—
which appear not to have materially assisted during Newmont-
Eurasian’s negotiations with landowners.141 Correspondence 
with the companies and interviews with landowners revealed 
that local members of the Conseil d’Administration de la Section 
Communale (CASEC) were in some cases present during home 
visits or during meetings conducted by Newmont-Eurasian. 
While Newmont-Eurasian claimed that the presence of the 
CASEC member “allowed for more transparency” in the pro-
cess,142 some community members reported that the presence 
of the local authorities made them feel like they did not have the 
option to reject the Land Access Agreement.143
In any case, it does not appear that the presence of CASEC 
members at various sites of consultation actually improved the 
quality of information disclosure or enhanced the consultation 
process—leading one to conclude that the government had vio-
lated many of its applicable obligations under domestic Haitian 
law and human rights law.144 Both international and regional 
human rights instruments binding on Haiti guarantee a right of 
access to information,145 which is also enshrined in the Haitian 
Constitution.146 In the Inter-American context, the right to access 
information is understood as a positive state duty to “provide the 
public with the maximum quantity of information proactively, at 
least in terms of . . . the information required for the exercise of 
other rights.”147 This is particularly important in the context of 
mining operations, where project-affected communities require 
sufficient information to allow them to meaningfully participate 
in decisions affecting their own lives and to protect their enjoy-
ment of other rights frequently impacted by mining operations, 
such as the right to water, the right to health, and the right to 
own and use land free from forced eviction.148 With respect to 
the administration of the Land Access Agreements, the positive 
duty of the Haitian state to provide for access to information 
under human rights law should also be read together with rel-
evant domestic laws, such as the 1976 Mining Decree, which 
guarantees arms-length negotiations between landowners and 
companies, and provides for recourse to an arbitral tribunal in 
the event of disagreement between the parties.149 If the state had 
informed residents of La Montagne with information about their 
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rights under the Mining Decree, the residents may have been at a 
better position to assert their rights and interests.
However, it must be recalled that the obligation of the 
Haitian state in these circumstances does not displace Eurasian’s 
obligation to comply with the IFC Performance Standards, and 
therefore does not negate any failure by Eurasian’s adequately 
disclose information about the project to affected communities. 
This is particularly important bearing in mind considering that 
a key rationale for the Performance Standards is to strengthen 
the accountability relationships between the company and com-
munity in governance contexts where the state is institutionally 
weak, and cannot be relied upon to protect the rights and inter-
ests of its project-affected communities.150
(iv) laCk of griEvanCE mEChanism for  
ProjECt-affECtED CommunitiEs
One final deficiency in Eurasian’s conduct during its explo-
ration activities in La Montagne relates to the company’s failure 
to provide an operational-level grievance mechanism (OGM) for 
the project-affected communities.151 PS1 requires companies to 
establish a grievance mechanism for project affected communi-
ties to receive and facilitate resolution of communities’ concerns 
about the client’s environmental and social performance.152 
Eurasian was under an obligation, even at the exploration phase, 
to operationalize such a mechanism and ensure that the proce-
dure was easily accessible and understandable, and to commu-
nicate its availability to affected communities.153 The obligation 
to establish an OGM also forms a critical component of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which the 
IFC clients should respect.154 Residents of La Montagne said 
that they were not aware of any grievance mechanism or any way 
to submit a complaint to Newmont-Eurasian, and the company 
has not adduced any evidence that a formal mechanism ever 
existed.155 While Newmont-Eurasian claimed that it had estab-
lished “informal” complaint mechanisms for project-affected 
communities, the GJC’s interviews with community members 
suggest that these informal mechanisms were not sufficiently 
publicized or accessible.156 The company’s failure to establish an 
accessible OGM was compounded by the community’s lack of 
effective recourse to the IFC CAO, discussed below.
Iv. evAluAtInG communItIes’ recourse  
to the cAo
(a) acceSS to the cao for proJect-affecteD 
communitieS in northern haiti
As the IFC had an equity stake in Eurasian from 2010-2015, 
project-affected communities in Haiti had the right to access 
the CAO as a mechanism to assert their grievances against the 
company.157 The CAO’s function as a “fallback mechanism” is 
particularly important in countries like Haiti, where communi-
ties cannot rely upon the government to protect their rights and 
in scenarios such as the one described here, where the company 
has failed to provide operational-level grievance mechanisms 
or other channels. The CAO, when functioning effectively, has 
the potential to mitigate disparities in power relations between 
companies and communities, put information in the hands of 
project-affected peoples, and encourage collaborative solu-
tions to localized grievances. For the communities affected 
by Eurasian’s activities in Northern Haiti, invoking the CAO’s 
ombudsman function may have helped to alleviate some of the 
gross failings of the company’s community engagement pro-
cesses, including both inadequate consultation and information 
disclosure. At the very least, at the urging of local communities, 
a CAO mediator could have helped to bring Eurasian to the table 
and encouraged a meaningful process of consultation.
The CAO was never engaged in Haiti—as project-affected 
communities, in La Montagne and at Eurasian’s other project 
sites, did not file a complaint with the mechanism. There were 
a number of factors which may help to explain why the mecha-
nism was not invoked in this case. It is arguable that the commu-
nities’ position as an ‘early equity project-affected community’ 
(EEPAC) played a significant role in determining whether or not 
the CAO was engaged. For the purpose of the following analy-
sis, EEPACs may be thought of as involving contexts in which 
there are only nascent levels of community mobilization around 
mining, limited informational resources, and weak linkages with 
transnational advocacy networks to help them survey complex 
accountability landscapes. Arguably, the design and operation of 
the CAO is not well equipped to respond to these unique dynam-
ics—undermining the capacity of the CAO to achieve its desired 
normative purpose of enhanced community responsiveness, and 
leaving the interests of EEPACs vulnerable to disregard in the 
earliest stages of mining operations.
The following analysis offers two potential explanations 
why EEPACs in Haiti may not have engaged the CAO mecha-
nism as a forum to assert their grievances. It does not purport to 
speak for, or on behalf of those communities, but merely seeks 
to reflect upon certain institutional, operational and contextual 
factors that may have rendered the CAO effectively inacces-
sible in the instant case. The first explanation relates primarily 
to the embryonic nature of community mobilization concerned 
about mining that exists during the earliest stages of mining 
operations. From the starting point that EEPACs in Haiti did not 
even know that the IFC and/or the CAO existed, it reflects that 
IAMs, like the CAO, are generally the most accessible and are 
most effective when affected communities have linkages with 
transnational advocacy networks that open up spaces for raising 
claims in international fora, and help to unlock accountability 
landscapes. The second explanation relates to concerns that the 
CAO does not offer a space for communities to contest develop-
ment paradigms, and the analysis attempts to dissect the multiple 
factors which may render EEPACs disinclined to engage with an 
accountability mechanism that is connected to an international 
financial institution funding the project. These types of “contes-
tational grievances,” which question the legitimacy of the CAO 
as a mediator or reject the need for a mediator at all, arise only 
after communities have the informational resources to under-
stand the nature of their concerns and form preferences about 
the ways they should be asserted.
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(b) community mobilization in the early StaGeS of 
mininG operationS
Unsurprisingly, the earliest stages of mining activity are 
accompanied by nascent (or even non-existent) stages of com-
munity mobilization around mining in project-affected areas. In 
fact, they appear to develop in parallel to one another. As mining 
activity matures, so to does the strength of the community mobi-
lization poised to respond to it. As the case of mineral explora-
tion in Northern Haiti highlights, one clear defect in the CAO’s 
institutional design is that its accessibility and efficacy may turn 
on the strength of community mobilization around the mining 
operations (including informational resources to facilitate stake-
holder mapping) and their connection to national and perhaps 
transnational networks. Where community mobilization is only 
weak, project-affected people are unlikely to bring complaints 
to the CAO, as they do not possess the informational, human, or 
financial resources to access the mechanism.
The concept of community mobilization in response to 
mineral extraction can be understood as a set of processes of 
collective action, that are sustained across space and time, that 
reflect grievances about perceived injustices, and may constitute 
the pursuit of alternative agendas.158 This mobilization develops 
in response to the threats presented by particular forms of eco-
nomic development. In the context of mineral extraction, there is 
a litany of common concerns that range from environmental and 
social impacts, such as concerns about interference with local 
water sources and resettlement, to grievances with the inequi-
table distribution of the harms and benefits of resource extrac-
tion. The extent to which this mobilization is able to modify 
development practices depends greatly on the relative power of 
the moments versus the economic actors involved.159 This means 
that in circumstances where the community mobilization around 
mining is weak, their capacity to influence decision-making 
and development outcomes may be significantly reduced.160 
Understandably, the strength of the movement critically depends 
on its access to financial, human, informational, social and other 
resources.161 In the earliest stages of mining activity, project-
affected communities’ access to such resources are considerably 
limited. The fact that these communities have not been previ-
ously exposed to mining operations means that they never had 
the need to accumulate the resources either.
At first glance, submitting a complaint to the CAO does 
not depend on the strength of the community mobilization in a 
project-affected area, since the process does not require a great 
deal of financial or human resources to engage. Its complaint 
submission process is well designed to maximize accessibility 
for project-affected communities. It does not have any formal 
requirements for complaints (other than that it is in writing), and 
it accepts these in any language.162 In theory, communities do 
not need to approach the CAO with complaints that are articu-
lated as legal claims (or refer to the Performance Standards), 
nor do they need to be substantiated by evidence.163 As distinct 
from human rights courts, complainants need not show there has 
been an exhaustion of domestic remedies prior to approaching 
the CAO, or establish that it has already attempted to engage 
with the company in any way.164 In contrast to the World Bank 
Inspection Panel, complaints can be lodged by a representative 
organization (such as a domestic or international NGO) as long 
as there is evidence of authority to do so.165 A complaint may 
be submitted by one individual alone or group of individuals 
(although during the CAO’s assessment phase, it will gather the 
viewpoint of other community members). This is an important 
procedural feature, since it does not demand any community-
wide coherence or agreement about the nature of the grievances 
prior to making a complaint. The cumulative effect of these 
features is that the CAO does ensure a commendable degree of 
procedural accessibility.
In the instant case, it appears that the CAO’s operational 
design does not go far enough in ensuring contextual acces-
sibility. The CAO’s contextual accessibility should take into 
account the lack of resources held by a community, which could 
inhibit the ability of its members to access the CAO. The case of 
mineral exploration in Haiti demonstrates how a lack of infor-
mational resources in particular can constrain the communities’ 
ability to map stakeholders, unlock complex accountability 
landscapes and access grievance mechanisms such as the CAO. 
In La Montagne, for example, the accessibility of the CAO must 
be understood in the context of the isolated terrain in which the 
residents live. Communities had very little information about the 
nature of the company’s interest in their land and the impacts 
and opportunities of gold mining that might occur in the com-
munities’ future.166 Residents have only limited access to formal 
education, and do not possess the informational resources (such 
as the internet, access to newspapers, radio, etc.) which could 
have enabled them to begin to grasp the complex nature of the 
investments and their potential modes of recourse against the 
company even at the early exploration stages.167 Crucially, the 
community members did not know what the IFC is, or that it had 
an equity interest in Eurasian.168 They did not have any idea that 
the CAO existed.
Internally, the CAO is well aware of these shortfalls. It notes 
that “there is very little knowledge of the existence of IFC and 
MIGA, and communities and civil society do not know that the 
investments in their midst have the World Bank Group’s involve-
ment.” 169 The CAO also claims that it has “persisted in asking 
IFC and MIGA to enhance efforts to ensure that communities 
know of their involvement, and are aware of the availability of, 
and access to, recourse where needed.”170 Of its own volition, 
the CAO undertakes outreach activities, which generally consist 
of meetings with domestic civil society organizations (CSOs), 
rather than undertaking direct outreach to affected or potentially 
affected communities.171 The CAO’s outreach activities in Haiti 
were limited to civil society meetings conducted in the U.S., that 
took place after Eurasian’s operations had been placed in care 
and maintenance status—with the result that communities and 
mining activists in the Northern departments did not know about 
the IFC or CAO until after the exploration activities by Eurasian 
had ceased.172 While Eurasian’s exploration activities were 
active, information about the CAO was only available online, 
which is insufficient in the instant case since project-affected 
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communities in remote areas such as La Montagne tend to lack 
access to computers or smartphones (even if project-affected 
communities in Haiti had access to the internet, the CAO web-
site is in French, not creole, and literacy levels are low, to say 
nothing of technical capacity).173
Notably, the IFC does not legally require the company to dis-
close the existence of the CAO to project-affected people (or the 
role of IFC funding in the project), although arguably this could 
be achieved by incorporating disclosure as part of the company’s 
Stakeholder Engagement Plans.174 The World Bank itself con-
cedes that evidence shows that “IFI and borrower staff are reluc-
tant in sharing information on accountability mechanisms with 
people in project affected areas.”175 Both the IFI and the company 
have a vested interest in ensuring that progress is not disrupted 
by community mediation, which can be timely and expensive. 
For example, between 2003-2015, Minera Yanacocha—an IFC-
sponsored company that operates the Yanacocha gold mine in 
Peru—has contributed $3.21 million USD to the CAO to pay 
for the costs of “extended-term CAO mediation” between the 
company and project affected communities.176
In the absence of a company that engages in meaningful 
community engagement at the earliest phases of its mining 
activity, remote communities like those in La Montagne face 
startling asymmetries in their informational resources compared 
to the companies encroaching upon their land. The ability of 
EEPACs to gain such resources (and in turn, unlock channels of 
redress such as the CAO) appears to depend in large part upon 
their links with broader networks of community mobilization, as 
well as domestic and international NGOs. Linkages to transna-
tional advocacy networks become crucial. Keck and Sikkink’s 
seminal work on transnational advocacy networks explains 
how they function to multiply channels of access to the inter-
national system, and help to make international resources avail-
able to new actors in domestic political and social struggles.177 
Transnational advocacy networks include “those relevant actors 
working internationally on an issue, who are bound together 
by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges 
of information and services.”178 In the case of transnational 
advocacy networks working on accountability struggles against 
large-scale mining operations, the shared values may be con-
ceived of as an overarching commitment to the empowerment 
of project-affected communities to have greater influence in the 
decisions that affect their lives—whether that entails the power 
of communities to veto a project in its entirety, to protect them-
selves against its threatened harms, or to access a greater share 
of its proposed benefits.179 Keck and Sikkink argue that at the 
core of the relationships in transnational advocacy networks is 
information exchange, which allows actors to mobilize informa-
tion strategically, gaining leverage over powerful entities.180
These linkages to transnational advocacy networks are 
extraordinarily important in the context of EEPACs, which face 
complex accountability landscapes they alone do not have the 
informational resources or experience to unlock. For commu-
nities, surveying the multiple actors, understanding their roles 
and knowing where to access channels of redress is a complex 
task. They are gravely burdened by the lack of transparency in 
modern development finance. The World Bank notes that “[w]
hat . . . project-affected people . . . see on the ground is the gov-
ernment, a company, or a subcontractor implementing a project. 
Where the financing is coming from is generally quite opaque to 
them.”181 As there is no duty for companies to disclose the fact 
of IFC funding (and in most cases, obligations around commu-
nity engagement during mineral exploration tend to be construed 
loosely), it is difficult to see how CAO could be accessible to 
EEPACs without help from broader advocacy networks.
At first glance, the CAO’s data presents a picture to the con-
trary. It finds that in the past 15 years, the majority of complaints 
to the CAO (44 per cent) have been filed solely by individuals 
and community members, without the assistance of other orga-
nizations on their behalf.182 A further 24 per cent of complaints 
were filed by local CSOs, 14 per cent by national CSOs, and 
only 8 per cent by international CSOs.183 However, this data 
does not capture the presence or absence of transnational advo-
cacy networks that may be helping to build the communities’ 
informational resources that ultimately facilitates their access to 
the CAO. It must also be understood in light of the increasing 
trend that international NGOs ‘remain in the background’ when 
communities lodge complaints to IAMs, given the preference 
held by IAMs for being directly contacted by communities.184 
The data also fails to capture the instances where communities 
were impacted by IFC-funded projects, but did not know the 
CAO existed (and so, did not register a complaint). An attempt 
to gauge the accessibility and efficacy of any accountability 
mechanism should pay close attention to how well it functioned 
for the people most-overlooked, whose rights and interests have 
been disregarded most acutely. During the years that Eurasian’s 
mining exploration activities were underway in Haiti, the CAO 
was effectively inaccessible. The CAO itself did not conduct 
outreach activities to the communities,185 and the communities 
had not yet forged relationships with transnational advocacy 
networks that might have helped to open up channels of redress.
The case study in Northern Haiti also illustrates why it is 
problematic for the accessibility of the CAO to hinge largely on 
the linkages that communities have with domestic NGOs and 
transnational advocacy networks. As noted earlier in this paper, 
the IFC’s investment in Eurasian was approved by the IFC Board 
of Directors just one day after Haiti was struck by the earth-
quake in 2010.186 Following the earthquake, NGOs attempting 
to undertake disaster relief and reconstruction flooded into 
the country on a scale as massive as the shock itself.187 This 
post-earthquake chaos compounded an already problematic 
NGO landscape in Haiti, which was frequently referred to as 
a ‘Republic of NGOs’ even before 2010.188 As a result of the 
outpouring of support from the international community, in 
the form of both charitable donations and grant funding, an 
immense (and inestimable) amount of funding was received 
by humanitarian NGOs.189 Having regard to the mammoth 
extent of the human rights violations occasioned by the January 
2010 earthquake,190 and the cholera outbreak brought by UN 
Peacekeepers in October of the same year,191 it is perhaps not 
23Spring 2017
surprising that isolated communities affected by mining explora-
tion in the country’s north were overlooked by advocacy NGOs 
operating in the country in the aftermath of the earthquake. 
While in another context, it might be expected that the presence 
of a transnational mining company would elicit immediate atten-
tion from domestic and international advocacy NGOs, the same 
could simply not be assumed in Haiti, a country caught up in 
a maelstrom of natural and man-made disasters. As this paper 
has attempted to show, linkages with domestic and international 
NGOs play a pivotal role in allowing project-affected communi-
ties to build the informational, human and financial resources 
needed to unlock complex accountability landscapes and access 
IAMs. Ultimately, these contextual factors must be kept in mind 
when appraising the true accessibility of IAMs such as the CAO, 
which critically rely on the presence of engaged civil society 
networks to facilitate their accessibility and usage.
Although Eurasian’s activities in Haiti ceased in 2012, 
project-affected communities in Haiti’s Northern departments 
continue to mobilize against the future threat of gold mining in 
their future. The Justice in Mining Collective (‘Koleftif Jistis 
Min’ or KJM), a platform of ten CSOs across Haiti, has since 
been working in mining-affected areas to inform local com-
munities of their rights related to the mining operations and the 
potential impacts of metal mining. In addition, the KJM made 
productive partnerships with a number of foreign-based advo-
cacy organizations in Canada, the United States, and in countries 
in Central and South America and in West and Central Africa.192 
Since 2013, KJM has worked closely with the Global Justice 
Clinic (GJC) of New York University School of Law. GJC con-
tinues to provide advocacy support and technical assistance to 
monitor the development of the extractive industry.193 In 2013, 
the KJM and GJC held a number of community meetings in 
Northern Haiti to discuss the potential impacts of gold mining 
if it returned the region.194 In an apt illustration of the reach 
of transnational advocacy networks, GJC advocates also held 
screenings of ‘video postcards’ that conveyed advice and shared 
the experiences from a mining-affected community from the 
Porgera Valley in Papua New Guinea.195 The KJM and GJC now 
works with community members to develop water monitoring 
practices, so that affected populations are accustomed to care-
fully tracking changes to their local water sources.196 Evidently, 
project-affected communities in Haiti’s north are increasingly 
gathering the type of informational resources necessary to 
make preferences about mining on their land in the future, as 
well as the technical and human resources necessary to defend 
their rights against mining companies if they return to conduct 
further exploration or extraction activities. There is no doubt that 
if gold mining does return to the region, the communities will 
have to grapple with the rapidly changing landscape of actors 
involved in such projects.197 However, they will be markedly 
better equipped to do so in light of the growing strength of their 
resources and their linkages to transnational advocacy networks 
across the world.
(c) the cao aS a Space for conteStinG anD 
reJectinG proJectS
The second hypothesis as to why EEPACs in Haiti may have 
been disinclined to file a complaint with the CAO is related to 
the fact that the mechanism does not offer sufficient space for 
communities to challenge the project and fundamentally contest 
the development paradigm that underlies it. This limitation goes 
beyond questions of accessibility in the strict sense, but goes to the 
heart of whether or not the mechanism is able to properly fulfill its 
normative function of enhancing responsiveness to communities 
in a meaningful sense. The issue arises once communities know 
about the potential for recourse to the CAO, and have enough 
information to make strategic decisions about how they wish to 
frame and assert their grievances against the company, state and 
IFIs sponsoring the project. It is important to note that by the time 
communities in Haiti had begun to connect with transnational 
advocacy networks and mobilize informational resources, the 
Newmont-Eurasian joint venture had completed its exploration 
activities and left the region. Technically, communities could have 
lodged a complaint with the CAO until January 2016, at which 
time the status of the IFC’s investment in Eurasian was marked as 
‘complete.’198 Community organizers noted that after 2012, there 
was a general sense amongst communities that they did not wish 
to re-engage with companies that had already left.199 Engaging 
with the CAO mechanism can be incredibly resource intensive for 
communities, and the resolutions brokered by the CAO’s media-
tion function often entail protracted, collaborative engagement 
with the company (such as joint water monitoring).200 For reasons 
discussed below, this is not the preferred mode of recourse for 
communities that reject the project outright; that do not wish to 
engage further with the company; or for whom it would be a waste 
of resources to channel energy into an IAM that cannot address 
their fundamental concerns.
By its institutional design, the CAO is limited to mitigating 
the environmental and social risks of IFC-sponsored projects. 
Through its ombudsman function it brings the company and 
communities together for enhanced dialogue and collaborative 
problem solving. Therefore, in circumstances in which com-
munities wish to entirely oppose resource extraction on their 
land, the CAO is an unsuitable venue for raising such claims.201 
Balaton-Chrimes and Haines draw an important distinction, 
in the field of accountability in development finance, between 
“imminent complaints” and “contestational grievances.”202 
Immanent complaints are those that primarily relate to social 
and environmental impacts of projects—to which the CAO may 
provide an appropriate forum for redress. Contestational griev-
ances are those that seek to reject the project entirely, or at the 
very least demand respect for the communities’ right to partici-
pate in the decision whether mining should go ahead at all. The 
problem-solving approach to accountability and focus on impact 
mitigation, espoused by the CAO, is appropriate for grievances 
regarding ‘how’ but not ‘whether’ a project should proceed.203
The distinction between immanent complaints and contes-
tational grievances can be particularly salient during the earliest 
phases of mining, when the state has not yet made a decision 
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whether to permit the construction of a mine and the extraction of 
resources from the land. By engaging with the CAO’s ombudsman 
function to address the environmental and social impacts of the 
project, communities may risk ‘depoliticizing’ the accountability 
struggle, by organizing and legitimating the broader account-
ability failures related to their contestational grievances.204 If 
communities wish to reject the project altogether, it may be more 
advantageous for them to engage in more adversarial advocacy 
strategies, asserting their grievances against the state which may 
still be considering whether to grant permits for mine development 
and resource extraction, rather than framing immanent complaints 
against the company by engaging the CAO (and implicitly legiti-
mating the company’s ‘right’ to be there). While it may also be 
advantageous for communities to assert their opposition directly 
against the company at the early phases of mining activity, though 
they may not wish to do so through the depoliticized and disciplin-
ing context of the CAO.
The community dynamics that exist in relation to the 
Amulsar gold project in Armenia, which also falls under the 
IFC’s early equity investment portfolio, are instructive.205 The 
IFC currently holds an equity stake in Lydian International 
Limited, a junior gold mining company, sponsoring explora-
tion activities in Armenia.206 In July 2014, project-affected 
communities filed a complaint with the CAO (with the help of 
nine domestic NGOs), highlighting the inadequacy of Lydian’s 
stakeholder engagement process and raising concerns about 
the project’s potential environmental and social impacts as the 
mine matures.207 Before an Agreement to Mediate was signed, 
community representatives decided they did not wish to par-
ticipate in mediation with the company after all, fearful that 
doing so would “compromise their principles” and undermine 
their broader opposition to the mine.208 There was a general 
recognition that the CAO’s ombudsman function did not provide 
an adequate space for the community to contest and reject the 
project in its entirety.
Although the Armenian communities felt the CAO’s 
ombudsman function was insufficiently suited to accommodate 
the nature of their accountability struggle, they did elect to have 
their complaint proceed through the CAO compliance func-
tion.209 As of April 2016, the case is under compliance audit, 
after an initial appraisal by the CAO found that the project raised 
“substantial concerns about a range of potential or actual envi-
ronmental and social impacts of the project,” 210 certain aspects 
of which relate directly “to its nature as an early equity mining 
investment.”211 Indeed, the CAO’s compliance appraisal identi-
fied many concerns that have been highlighted in the context of 
mineral exploration activities in Northern Haiti.212 In particular, 
it identified problems with the company’s restricted stakeholder 
engagement, the lack of information given to project-affected 
people, the absence of a company grievance mechanism, as well 
as broader concerns about the company’s land acquisition under 
PS5—including a failure to deal with landholders transparently 
during the exploration phase.213
Importantly, the CAO’s compliance investigation, which 
is currently pending, will go beyond an assessment of the 
company’s exploration activities and will include a review of 
the project’s potential impacts on the environment and surround-
ing communities, as the mine moves into the development and 
construction phase in 2016. Once the report is released publicly, 
communities will have a significant amount of information at 
their disposal, such as evaluations of Lydian’s environmental 
and social management systems, which can be used to inform 
their broader accountability struggles. Thus, although the CAO’s 
ombudsman function did not offer a suitable forum for redress 
for the communities in Armenia, the products of the compliance 
function may at least help to partially correct the informational 
asymmetries between the parties.
It is worth noting, however, that the communities’ capacity 
to use the information generated by the CAO’s compliance func-
tion may turn on the strength of their linkages with transnational 
advocacy networks and access to impartial experts. In order to 
use information such as environmental and social impact assess-
ments (ESIAs) for leverage in accountability struggles, commu-
nities often rely on alliances with scientific and technical experts 
from both domestic and international NGOs and universities.214 
These alliances can help to place communities in a position to 
engage in dialogue with the government and mining companies 
about the projects, and may be crucial in facilitating the capacity 
of communities to thoroughly frame and assert their rights and 
interests.215 For isolated communities with low literacy levels 
and scarce access to formal education—and in the absence of 
dense linkages and trust within such networks—there is a very 
real risk that CAO compliance assessments could operate as 
spaces through which processes of exclusion are reproduced and 
legitimated. This risk appears to be particularly acute in cases 
involving the earliest phases of mining activity, where levels of 
community mobilization in response to mining are nascent, and 
connections with transnational advocacy networks may be weak 
or non-existent.
v. conclusIon
At the outset of this paper, it was suggested that the involve-
ment of an IFC in a mining project has the potential to disrupt 
and re-orient the typically vexed relationships that exist between 
company, state and project-affected communities. This is of 
particular importance for projects within the IFC’s early equity 
portfolio, where the IFC’s governance functions (such as the 
Environmental and Social Performance Standards) have the 
potential to embed responsible practices and establish positive 
company-community relations that endure as the mine matures. 
However, as the case study of Eurasian Minerals in Haiti has 
shown, the ability of the IFC to redefine traditional account-
ability relationships and enhance project outcomes has been 
significantly limited.
As the IFC’s primary institution for bringing about citizen-
led accountability, the availability and efficacy of the CAO 
plays a critical role in allowing citizens’ voices to be heard 
when the IFC’s governance functions are failing, and projects 
are adversely affecting communities’ rights and interests. While 
the CAO is often heralded for its simple complaints submission 
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procedure, this is not where an analysis of its accessibility 
should end. Ultimately, the CAO’s accessibility must be viewed 
in light of important contextual factors within project-affected 
communities, such as nascent stages of community mobilization 
and linkages (or lack thereof) to transnational advocacy net-
works which can help to unlock accountability landscapes. The 
case study in Northern Haiti is an important one, as it demon-
strates the CAO’s failings with respect to those communities that 
are most marginalized. As has been shown, while exploration 
activities were undertaken, those communities had no capacity 
to know the nature of the project or the IFC’s investment, and 
had no knowledge of the right of recourse to the CAO. Unless 
the CAO’s functions are to remain as sites of continued exclu-
sion, the CAO’s outreach activities directly to project-affected 
communities must be enhanced, and companies should be placed 
under more onerous obligations to disclose the availability of the 
CAO as part of their stakeholder engagement plans. While some 
communities in the early equity context may prefer to eschew the 
CAO’s depoliticized and disciplining processes as inappropriate 
spaces for asserting contestational grievances, at the very least 
those communities have the right to make fully informed strate-
gic decisions about their accountability struggles. In the end, the 
lessons drawn from this case study serve as an earnest call to the 
IFC and CAO to better understand the deeply contextual nature 
of the CAO’s true accessibility, and to devise solutions to ensure 
that the most vulnerable project-affected communities are not 
again overlooked. 
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